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Abstract
The veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utili-
tarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In
a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it
to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ that she calls
Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allow-
ing that agent’s behind the veil are averse to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to
ambiguity—which is both the most commonly observed and a seemingly reason-
able attitude to ambiguity—however supports a version of Egalitarianism, whose
logical form is quite different from the theories defended by the aforementioned
authors. Moreover, it turns out that the veil of ignorance argument neither sup-
ports standard Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that rational
people are insensitive to ambiguity.
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1 Introduction
The Veil of Ignorance is a powerful tool, that has been used by different authors to defend
divergent views in distributive ethics. The function of the veil is to blind people to
both their social positions as well as to their endowments and attitudes, and is meant
to ensure that the preferences that people reveal between different “social gambles” are
indicative of—or, alternatively, determine—the just arrangement of social institutions
and the fair distribution of goods. The thought is that if people neither know what
roles they occupy nor what assets or attitudes they have, then their preferences will
be equally sensitive to the interests of all, and will therefore correspond to those of a
fair-minded social-planner.
The term, “veil of ignorance”, was coined by John Rawls (1971), who famously
used it to defend the view that benefits to the worst off take absolute priority over
benefits to the better off. But before Rawls coined the term, John C. Harsanyi (1953,
1955) had used a similar construction to defend (Average) Utilitarianism, according
to which the value of benefiting a person depends only on the size (in utility) of the
benefit, and average welfare should be maximized.1
In a recent article, Lara Buchak (2017) revives the idea of a veil of ignorance to
defend a theory she calls Relative Prioritarianism (but which is typically called Rank-
Weighted Utilitarianism), and which is an intermediate between the theories defended
by Harsanyi and Rawls. Drawing on her recent theory of rational attitudes to risk
(Buchak 2013), she sides with Rawls in claiming that rational preferences behind the
veil of ignorance support the view that benefiting a person matters more the worse off
she is. But she also agrees with Harsanyi’s view that all benefits—including those to
the very best off—always count for something.
1All existing attempts to apply decision theory in the veil of ignorance argument replace a fixed number
of states of the world (or events) with a fixed number of individuals (or groups of individuals). Hence,
although these arguments strictly speaking support some average view, be it Utilitarian, Prioritarian,
or Egalitarian, average and total views are extentionally equivalent given the employed framework.
Alternative applications are possible, and would certainly be worth carrying out. In this paper I shall
nevertheless follow the tradition in assuming a fixed state space and, correspondingly, a fixed population.
And since average and total views are extentionally equivalent given such a framework, the prefix
“average” will typically be omitted.
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Rawls’ argument differs from Buchak’s and Harsanyi’s arguments in whether peo-
ple behind the veil are taken to know the probability with which they occupy the
different social positions: Whereas Rawls stipulated that people behind the veil have
no such probabilistic information, Buchak and Harsanyi stipulated that the people
know precisely these probabilities. The approach explored in this paper could be
seen as a compromise between these two extreme positions: It will be stipulated that
people behind the veil do not know the precise probability with which they occupy
the different social position, but it will be assumed that they have some beliefs about
these probabilities.2
The assumption that people behind the veil have some, but not precise, probabilistic
information, makes it possible to ask what attitudes they take to what is often called
ambiguity, in particular, whether they prefer known probabilities (or “chances”) over
unknown ones. Inspired by Buchak’s (2017) argument that we should take people
behind the veil to adopt the most risk averse attitude within reason, I shall argue, first,
that ambiguity aversion is a form of risk aversion,3 and, consequently, that we should
assume that people behind the veil are averse to ambiguity.
The main aim of this paper is to examine what theory of distributive ethics is
supported if one assumes that people behind the veil of ignorance are both ambiguity
averse and have the so-called Allais preference (Allais 1953), which Buchak’s theory is
designed to accomodate. To this end, I apply to the veil of ignorance setting a theory
that was recently developed by Stefa´nsson and Bradley (2015, 2019) specifically to
simultaneously account for ambiguity aversion and Allais-type risk aversion. The re-
2Mongin’s (2001) generalization of the veil of ignorance argument can similarly be seen as a compro-
mise between the epistemic assumptions made on one hand by Buchak-Harsanyi and on the other hand
by Rawls. Like me (and unlike Rawls), Mongin assumes that people behind the veil have some (subjec-
tive) estimates of the likelihood of corresponding to each member in the ranked distributions. Moreover,
Mongin assumes, like me (and unlike Buchak and Harsanyi), that no probability assignment is forced
upon people behind the veil. However, Mongin assumes that people’s preferences between gambles
with objective probabilities satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) axioms, and that people’s pref-
erences between gambles with subjective probabilities satisfy the additional Anscombe-Aumann (1963)
axioms. In contrast, I shall only assume that people’s preferences satisfy the Jeffrey-Bolker (1965, 1966)
axioms. (Another author who (very briefly) explores ambiguity aversion behind the veil is Ellsworth
1978.)
3The claim that ambiguity aversion is a form of risk aversion is defended by Bradley (2016) and
Stefa´nsson and Bradley (2019).
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sulting argument then supports a form of Egalitarianism that I call Distribution-Sensitive
Utilitarianism,4 and whose logical form is quite different from the theories defended
by Buchak, Harsanyi, and Rawls. Moreover, we’ll see that the veil of ignorance ar-
gument supports neither standard (i.e., additively separable; see fn. 25) Utilitarianism
nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that people behind the veil are insensitive to
ambiguity.
If one accepts the normative importance of the veil of ignorance argument, then
there are (at least) three different lessons for distributive ethics that one could draw
from this paper. First, those who are committed to the rational permissibility and
reasonableness of sensitivity to ambiguity can take the present paper to be an argu-
ment in favor of Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism. Second, those who don’t like
(standard) Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism can read the paper as an argument that
rational people behind the veil can be sensitive to ambiguity. Third, those who like
(standard) Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism, can read the paper as an argument that
rational people behind the veil are not sensitive to ambiguity.
In contrast to the interpretations suggested above, one could also read this paper
as undermining the normative importance of the veil of ignorance argument. For
instance, Prioritarians and Utilitarians who are convinced that ambiguity sensitivity
is rationally permissible, can read the paper as a reductio of one of the main premises
of any veil of ignorance argument, namely, the premise that the preferences of people
behind the veil reveal or determine principles of distributive ethics. Alternatively, such
scholars could question the veil of ignorance framework employed in this paper, in
particular, they could argue that we should assume knowledge of precise probabilities
4People might object to the term, Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism, on two grounds. First, they
might object to it on the grounds that all Utilitarianism is distributive sensitive, for instance, since
consumption and wealth has decreasing marginal utility. As we shall see, however, the distribution to
which the theory in question is sensitive, is a distribution of individual welfare (so not just consumption
or wealth). Second, and in light of the response to the first objection, some might object that Distribution-
Sensitive Utilitarianism is an oxymoron: By definition, they might claim, Utilitarianism is not sensitive
to distribution of welfare. In response, it should be emphasized that “Utilitarianism”, as the term is used
here, simply refers to the theory that utility, understood as a numerical (typically, but not necessarily,
cardinal) representation of a relation should be maximized. But that leaves open how utility is determined,
and is, as we shall see, consistent with various forms of Egalitarianism being classified as Utilitarianism.
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behind the veil.5 Finally, one could read this paper as showing, in conjunction with the
arguments of Harsanyi, Rawls and Buchak, that since the veil of ignorance argument
is so sensitive to subtle modelling choices, the argument does not settle the debates
between the main competing views in distributive ethics.
2 The veil of ignorance argument
In this section, I sketch the veil of ignorance argument as it will be employed in this
paper. As most parts of the argument are very well-known, in particular, from the
works of Harsanyi and Rawls, I shall focus on how the present argument differs from
Harsanyi’s and Rawls’, as well as from Buchak’s.
It will be assumed that people behind the veil of ignorance evaluate and rank
tuples of social groups (i.e., lists of social groups), where each group can be thought
of as an equivalence class of welfare.6 Intuitively, it makes sense to think of these
tuples as welfare distributions, and they will frequently be referred to as welfare
distributions throughout the paper. Note, however, that welfare, thus understood, is
not (yet) a quantitative notion, but a comparative one, unlike the utilities that will later
be introduced to represent the ranking of these welfare distributions. That is, these
welfare distributions are not distributions of quantities, but rather distributions of
groups of people where people within a group are deemed equally well-off. Moreover,
the ranking can intuitively be thought of as a preference ranking, i.e., the idea is that
people behind the veil ask themselves which distribution they would prefer to be
actual, without knowing to which group in the distribution they will then belong.
The argument can be presented in five premises.7 First, following the tradition of
Harsanyi and Rawls, it will be assumed that the preferences that people display behind
the veil of ignorance corresponds to the relative goodness of the ranked distributions,
5I thank a referee for suggesting this reading.
6This means that we assume that the veil of ignorance argument concerns only how welfare should
be distributed (and not which rights and liberties we should grant people), which makes the argument
more limited than the version developed by Rawls.
7The presentation closely follows Buchak’s (2017).
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and (assuming teleology) thus inform us what distribution of welfare we should aim
to achieve.
Second, interpersonal comparability of utility and welfare will be assumed. More
precisely, I assume (with Buchak and Harsanyi) that individuals behind the veil of
ignorance all agree on a unique8 cardinal (utility) representation of the welfare of
the members of the ranked distributions. This is not to say that the individuals
in the ranked distributions have a shared utility function. Rather, the assumption
is that when two individuals behind the veil consider two individuals in a ranked
distribution, the individuals behind the veil agree on a cardinal representation of
the welfare of the two individuals in the distribution. Due to this and the fourth
assumption, discussed below, we can treat choice behind the veil as the choice of a
single individual. That is, when representing the attitudes of people behind the veil,
only one utility function is needed. So, no bargaining or collective deliberation needs
to be modeled or assumed, nor need we assume that any social aggregation procedure
takes place behind the veil.
Third, it will be assumed, with Buchak and Harsanyi, that people behind the
veil can form some (meaningful) assessments of the probability of corresponding to
different members of the distributions that they are evaluating. But unlike Buchak
and Harsanyi, I allow for the possibility that people behind the veil are not fully
confident in their probability judgments. More precisely, it will be assumed that
people behind the veil assign subjective probabilities to different objective probability
(or “chance”) distributions that specify the chance of corresponding to each member,
but (contra Buchak and Harsanyi) it will be assumed that they may assign a positive
subjective probability to more than one such distribution. As previously mentioned,
this can be seen as a compromise between the positions of Harsanyi and Buchak, on
the one hand, and on the other hand the position of Rawls, who assumed that no such
probability assignments can be made behind the veil. The main motivation for this
third assumption is to explore what implications this particular compromise has for
8That is, unique up to a point of scale and starting point.
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distributive ethics.
Fourth, I shall follow Buchak in assuming that when choosing for others whose
risk attitudes one does not know, one should “err on the side of caution and choose the
less risky option, within reason” (Buchak 2017: 631). To support this claim, Buchak
(330-336) considers what risks one could justifiably take if one stumbled upon a person
in need of one of two medical interventions that carry with them different levels of risk.
In such a situation, she suggests, it seems intuitive that, other things being roughly
equal, one would be morally required to choose the less risky of the two interventions
if one did not know the person’s risk attitudes.9,10 Applied to the veil of ignorance
argument, this intuition supports ascribing to individuals behind the veil of ignorance
“the most risk-avoidant reasonable risk attitude” (638).11 (Note that the potentially
diverging risk attitudes and beliefs of the individuals in the ranked distributions are
however ignored.12)
Fifth, it will be assumed that aversion to ambiguity can be a perfectly reasonable
form of risk aversion; thus, I shall assume that people behind the veil can be ambiguity
averse (as well as having the Allais preference). Since the assumption that ambiguity
9If one however knows a person’s risk attitude, then she thinks one should defer to it.
10It is worth noting, as a referee points out, that by “risk” attitudes Buchak does not mean only
the curvature of the person’s utility function (as has become tradition in, for instance, economic theory).
Rather, she means a more general form of risk aversion that is captured by, for instance, her risk-weighted
expected utility theory.
11Although Buchak does not explicitly say so, it seems that she takes the reasonable attitudes behind
the veil to be a subset of the set of rational attitudes. I shall not make that assumption, however, but will
instead leave open the possibility that an attitude could be reasonable without being rational. After all,
it would seem that an attitude could be reasonable without being rational in the strict decision-theoretic
(or coherence) sense. I shall get back to the concepts of reason and rationality in later sections.
12 Well-known problems arise when taking people’s heterogenous beliefs into account in social eval-
uations. In particular, there is a conflict between heterogeneity in beliefs at the individual level and
seemingly natural constraints on the social evaluation. (See e.g. Mongin 1995 and Bradley 2005 for
discussions of problems of this kind when it comes to preference aggregation, and Mongin 2001 for a
discussion of analogous problems for the veil of ignorance argument.) These problems can be avoided
by relaxing either the assumptions of individual rationality (to some extent in the line with the relaxation
that I suggest below), or by relaxing the constraint on the social evaluation. (For an overview of this
literature, as well as a sophisticated new approach to aggregation under uncertainty, see Monging and
Pivato ms.) Nevertheless, to keep things as simple as possible, I shall from now on assume that the beliefs
of the individuals in the ranked distributions are ignored, in the sense that only what we could think of
as people’s actual welfare counts. Thus, it will be assumed that people’s beliefs are taken into account in
the social evaluation only in so far as they directly affect people’s welfare (e.g. by making them happy or
upset). In contrast, people’s potentially misguided beliefs about how their interests are best served are
ignored.
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aversion is (or can be) a form of risk aversion is perhaps the most novel part of the
present version of the veil of ignorance argument, I devote special attention to it in
section 3.
To capture the above assumptions about the attitudes of people behind the veil,
I apply, as previously mentioned, a theory recently developed by Stefa´nsson and
Bradley (2015, 2019), and find that the argument then supports the aforementioned
Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism.
3 Aversion to ambiguity
In this section I explain sensitivity to ambiguity, that is, an agent’s sensitivity to
how uncertain she is about the relevant probability distribution. The importance of
attitudes to ambiguity was originally brought to the attention of decision theorists and
economists through the so-called Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961), one version of which
is presented in the Appendix (A.1). But they can be illustrated much more simply with
the following example (Stefa´nsson and Bradley 2019).13
Suppose that you have in front of you a coin, C1, that you know to be perfectly
symmetric, and that you know to have been tossed a great number of times and has
come up heads exactly as many times as it has come up tails. More generally, suppose
that you possess the best possible evidence for the coin being unbiased. Two questions:
(1) To what degree do you believe that C1 will come up heads on the next toss? (2)
How much would you be willing to pay for a gamble whereby you get $10 if C1 lands
heads up on its next toss but get nothing otherwise?
Now suppose instead that you have in front of you a coin, C2, that you know to
be either double headed or double tailed, but you don’t know which way it is biased.
13It is worth emphasizing that although the simple illustration assumes that degrees of belief can be
measured independently of preference, many experiments on ambiguity sensitivity do not make that
assumption. In fact, Ellsberg’s (1961) suggested experiments, one of which is discussed in Appendix A.1,
make no such assumption.
Another difference between on one hand the simple illustration and on the other hand Ellsberg paradox,
is that the former but not the latter employs two distinct probability spaces. (Thanks to Philippe Mongin
for bringing this to my attention.)
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Again, two questions: (1’) To what degree do you believe that C2 will come up heads
on the next toss? (2’) How much would you be willing to pay for a gamble whereby
you get $10 if C2 lands heads up on its next toss but get nothing otherwise?
Many people seem to use something like the Principle of Insufficient Reason14
when answering questions like (1’) (see e.g. Binmore et al. 2012). Since they have
no more reason for thinking that the coin will come up heads than tails, they are
equally confident in these two possibilities. So, since these possibilities (let’s assume)
exhaust the possibility space, they should believe to degree 0.5 that the second coin
comes up heads. But that is, of course, the same degree to which they should believe
that the first coin comes up heads, assuming something like Lewis’ (1980) Principal
Principle, which, informally, states that one’s knowledge about chances, i.e., objective
probabilities, should guide one’s degree of belief, i.e., subjective probabilities.
What about questions (2) and (2’)? A number of experimental results on Ellsberg-
type decision problems have shown that a large share of subjects as diverse as students,
trade union leaders, actuaries, and executives, are ambiguity averse, meaning that
other things being equal, they prefer gambles with known chances of outcomes over
gambles with unknown chances (for an overview of these experimental results, see e.g.
Machina and Siniscalchi 2014 and Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015). More generally,
people tend to prefer less spread in subjectively possible chances over more spread,
other things being equal; i.e., they prefer the chance values that they don’t take to be
ruled out by their evidence to be spread over a smaller interval rather than a larger
one, other things being equal. In the example under discussion, ambiguity aversion
translates into a preference for a gamble on C1—where the subjectively possible chances
are confined to a single value, 0.5., and thus minimally spread—over a gamble on C2—
where the subjectively possible chances are spread over the whole zero-one interval—
14Roughly speaking, the Principle of Insufficient Reason states that for any two propositions, if you
have no reason for being more confident of the truth of one proposition than the other, then you should
be equally confident in their truth. The principle can give rise to well-known problems when applied to
sample spaces for which there are different but equally “natural” (finest) partitions. But these problems
need not worry us in the present context, where there does seem to be a single most natural partition,
namely {double headed, double tailed}.
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and hence a willingness to pay more for the first gamble than the second.15
The above gambles can be straightforwardly turned into “social gambles” or distri-
butions like those that people behind the veil of ignorance are asked to rank. Suppose
you know that social gamble, or distribution, di, confers a 0.5 chance on you leading an
excellent life and a 0.5 chance on you leading a life that is barely worth living. Gamble
d j, in contrast, either condemns you for sure to a life barely worth living or ensures
that you will lead an excellent life; but you don’t know towards which life the gamble
is biased and you find each bias to be equally likely. Then, if you are ambiguity averse,
you prefer di over d j.
This is not the place to argue for the rational permissibility of ambiguity aversion,
as exemplified by a preference for the gamble on coin C1 over the gamble on coin C2.16
For the present purposes, the important point is the claim that ambiguity aversion
is a form of risk aversion (as argued in Bradley 2016, Stefa´nsson and Bradley 2019).
In decision theory and economics, a person is said to be risk averse with respect to
some (real valued) good G if she prefers a gamble gi to another gamble g j which has
the same expected benefit of G as gi but a greater spread in the possible values of G.
In other words, a person is risk averse if she prefers a gamble to a mean-preserving
spread of it.
Now let’s compare the above understanding of what it is to be risk averse with
ambiguity aversion, as exemplified by a preference for a gamble on coin C1 over a
gamble on coin C2. A person with this attitude prefers one gamble gi to another g j
which has the same expected chance of resulting in a good (winning $10) as gi but has
15A perhaps seemingly alternative explanation of the attitudes under discussion, which nevertheless
turns out to be logically equivalent to the above one given the framework presented in the next section,
is that even ex post, people prefer to actually have had a chance, rather than just having thought that they
had a chance.
16But see e.g. Gilboa et.al. (2009) for an argument that it is, in some circumstances, more rational to have
ambiguity averse preferences than ambiguity neutral ones. Examples of authors who take ambiguity
aversion to be rationally permissible include Binmore (2008), Rowe and Voorhoeve (2018) and Stefa´nsson
and Bradley (2019). Not everyone agrees, however, that ambiguity aversion is rationally permissible.
Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) for instance argue that ambiguity aversion is generally irrational, while
Fleurbaey (2018) argues that ambiguity aversion may be rationally permissible when it comes to personal
preferences but not when it comes to social evaluations.
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a greater spread in the chance of resulting in the good:17 the whole zero-one interval
compared to just 0.5. In other words, this person prefers a gamble to a mean-preserving
spread of it. So, we should say that this person is risk-averse with respect to chances of
winning $10.
Why is it important to establish that ambiguity aversion is a form of risk aversion?
The reason is that it shows that if we accept the fourth premise of the veil of ignorance
argument, then we should assume that people behind the veil adopt ambiguity averse
preferences. Recall that this premise, which is adopted from Buchak, states that when
choosing for someone without knowing the person’s risk attitude, one should assume
the most risk averse attitude within reason. This Buchak interprets as a rather strong
requirement: “if a reasonable person could reject [an option on the grounds that it is
too risky], then we are not justified in choosing it” on someone else’s behalf (Buchak
2017: 631; emphasis added). Moreover, she (correctly, it seems) takes this to imply that
people behind the veil should (and thus will) adopt the most risk averse preference
within reason. So, if ambiguity aversion is a form of risk aversion, as I contend, and
since on the face of it reasonable people (college students, union leaders, actuaries,
executives, etc.) often do reject options on the grounds that they are too ambiguous,
then it follows from the fourth premise that people behind the veil should (and thus
will) adopt the most ambiguity averse preference within reason. Hence, people behind
the veil will, other things being equal, opt for non-ambiguous distributions.
Allowing for sensitivity to ambiguity can, as previously noted, be seen as a way of
reaching a compromise between Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ epistemic assumptions about
the veil of ignorance. Whereas Harsanyi effectively assumed that people behind the
veil of ignorance would be fully confident in one particular probability distribution
over the different social positions, namely, the uniform distribution, Rawls famously
argued that people behind the veil have no basis for making such judgments and thus
17As a referee points out, this assumes that the decision-makers of interest, while not having precise
subjective probabilities, has judgments about different potential (objective) probability distributions.
There are even “more ambiguous” situations that do not fit this description, but they will be set aside
in this paper, where it will be assumed that, for instance, people behind the veil have judgments about
different possible objective probabilities.
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cannot form meaningful probability estimates for the different social positions. In con-
trast, I shall assume that people behind the veil use their beliefs about chances to form
subjective estimates of probabilities, but need not be fully confident in these estimates,
since they may consider multiple different objective probability distributions to be
possible. Moreover, the thought that people may be sensitive to ambiguity behind the
veil will be captured by assuming that, even holding fixed the subjective expectation
of chance, people need not be indifferent between, on one hand, social gambles where
the range of chance distributions that they take to be epistemically possible is narrow,
and on the other hand, social gambles where the range of epistemically possible chance
distributions is wide.
4 Incorporating ambiguity sensitivity
The decision theory that Buchak applies to her veil of ignorance argument, that is,
her “risk weighted expected utility theory”, cannot capture ambiguity aversion (for
a discussion, see Stefa´nsson and Bradley’s 2019). Nor, of course, can the theory that
Harsanyi applied, that is, expected utility theory as developed by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). However, unlike the theory that Harsanyi applied, Buchak’s
theory can account for the so-called Allais preference (named after Maurice Allais 1953).
I shall not discuss this preference in detail, but the property of the Allais preference
that I focus on—a property that is inconsistent with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
theory—is that it values, say, a n gain in the probability of winning a great prize
differently if the prior probability was 1−n than if the prior probability was m < (1−n).
The aim of this section is to explore what happens if we assume that people behind
the veil of ignorance both have the types of risk attitudes that Buchak’s theory is meant
to capture—in particular, Allais preference—and in addition are averse to ambiguity, as
described in the last section. As far as I am aware, the only explicitly normative decision
theory satisfying this constraint is Stefa´nsson and Bradley’s (2015, 2019) extension
of Richard Jeffrey’s (1965) theory to chance propositions. In this section a sketch of
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the theory in question is presented, but in the next section we shall see why, when
employed in the veil of ignorance argument, the theory supports Distribution-Sensitive
Utilitarianism.
To allow for ambiguity aversion, understood as suggested in the last section, we
need a framework where both objective probabilities (or chances) and subjective ones
(or degrees of belief ) are represented.18 To achieve this, Stefa´nsson and Bradley allow
agents to take both conative and cognitive attitudes to both factual propositions and
chance propositions,19 defined as follows. Let Ω be a Boolean algebra20 of propositions
(i.e., sets of possible worlds) describing “ultimate” outcomes, e.g. that one wins $10
(in an ordinary choice scenario) or lives at a particular level of welfare (in the veil of
ignorance choice scenario). Let ∆ be a Boolean algebra of propositions describing all
possible objective probability (or chance) distributions over the propositions in Ω. For
instance, for any proposition X ∈ Ω and any value n ∈ [0, 1], there is a proposition
Ch(X) = n ∈ ∆ which is true just in case the chance of X is n (denoted ch(X) = n). Strictly
speaking, we should think of these chance propositions as being time-indexed (since
chances evolve), but as the veil of ignorance decision-problem is static, the time-index
can be safely ignored.
Let 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 denote the intersection of the propositions Ch(X1) = α1, Ch(X2) =
α2, ..., Ch(Xn) = αn, where {Xi}ni=1 is an n-fold partition of Ω and the αi are real numbers
in [0, 1] such that
∑n
i=1 αi = 1. So, 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 is a gamble that results in outcome Xi
with chance αi. In other words, gambles like 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 correspond to lotteries in
the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) framework.
Finally, let Γ = ∆ × Ω, and suppose that a rational person’s preferences between
propositions in Γ, and similarly between propositions in both Ω and ∆, satisfy the
18For the present purposes, objective probability is whatever plays the role of chance in the Principal
Principle (discussed below). So, objective probabilities are any probabilities such that if you know them,
then they should constrain your subjective probabilities. Hence, relative frequencies could count as
objective probabilities (even in a deterministic world).
19The possibility of agents taking (non-derivative) conative attitudes to chances is a crucial difference
between on one hand Stefa´nsson and Bradley’s framework and on the other hand the framework of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963), in which both subjective and objective probabilities are also represented.
20That is, a set closed under the Boolean operators.
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Jeffrey-Bolker axioms (Jeffrey 1965: ch. 9, Bolker 1966).
In the veil of ignorance setting, the above assumptions mean that the people are
faced with a set Ω of possible (ordinal) welfare levels, formulated as propositions
that form a Boolean algebra; and they are faced with a set of chance distributions
over these welfare levels (representing the chances that they will have each welfare
level), also formulated as propositions that form a Boolean algebra; and faced with the
crossproduct of these two sets (which also forms a Boolean algebra). Moreover, the
people’s preferences order the elements of these three sets in a way that satisfies the
Jeffrey-Bolker axioms.
The above assumptions entail that there is (by Bolker’s 1966 theorem) a subjective
probability measure P on Γ, and a utility function u on the same set except that the con-
tradictory proposition has been removed, relative to which the person’s preferences,
over say ∆, can be represented as maximizing:
Desirability. For any G = 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 ∈ ∆ and any n-fold partition {Yi}ni=1 of G:
V(G) =
n∑
i=1
u(Yi)P(Yi | 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉) (1)
To take an example, let G be the proposition that you win $10 if a coin comes
up heads but nothing otherwise, i.e., intuitively the proposition that you gamble on
heads. We can partition this proposition into two possibilities according to whether
the coin comes up heads or tails (for simplicity, we can assume that it cannot land and
stay on its edge). Hence, Desirability entails that the desirability ofG equals the utility
of the gamble when the coin comes up heads, weighted by your conditional subjective
probability for the coin coming up heads given G, plus the utility of the gamble when
the coin comes up tails, weighted by your conditional subjective probability for the
coin coming up tails given G.21
Now let’s briefly see how the theory sketched above can simultaneously account
21As those who are familiar with Jeffrey’s framework will know, the utility function, u, is actually itself
a desirability function. So, the “utility” of taking the gamble when the coin comes up heads also satisfies
equation (1). Hence, the difference between the two functions u and V is nothing but their domain.
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Figure 1: S-shaped utility function (u) over chances (ch).
for the Allais preference and ambiguity aversion (but see Stefa´nsson and Bradley 2019
for a more thorough discussion). The simple reason why it can account for both these
attitudes, is that since chance distributions are included in the domain of the utility
function, it can accommodate the idea that the added benefit of an increase in the
chance of a good might depend on the prior chance; for instance, the idea that a 0.1
gain in the chance of a good is more valuable when the prior chance was 0 than when
the prior chance was 0.4. As an illustration, suppose an s-shaped utility function over
chances, concave over almost the whole zero-one interval but with an inflection point
at the very top after which the function is convex (as in Figure 1), and a linear utility
function over money (as in Figure 2).
To see how a person with ambiguity averse preferences can be represented as
maximizing desirability given the above types of functions, recall again the choice
between a bet on coin C1 and a bet on coin C2, where the first coin is known to be fair
but the second is known to be either double headed or double tailed. Now if a person’s
utility function over chances is concave over most parts of the zero-one interval, then
she will prefer a bet on the first coin over a bet on the second coin. Simplifying the
notation somewhat,22 for such a person, it will be the case that:
22 Since we know that we are dealing with gambles that either result in a “desirable” prize ($10) or
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Figure 2: Linear utility function (u) over money ($).
u(Ch($10) = 1) − u(Ch($10) = 0.5) < u(Ch($10) = 0.5) − u(Ch($10) = 0) (2)
In other words, for such a person, the undesirability of the risk that the second coin
is double tailed outweighs the desirability of the possibility that the second coin is
double headed, when compared to the first coin, a bet on which has a sure 0.5 chance
of resulting in the prize. More generally, ambiguity averse preferences, w.r.t. a gamble
G, can be represented by a utility function over G’s chances that is at least as concave
as the utility function over G’s possible prizes (Bradley 2016, Stefa´nsson and Bradley
2019).
The inflection point of the utility function over chances around the upper end of the
zero-one interval, after which the function is convex, means that the utility function
can also represent a person with the Allais preference. For instance, it can be seen
from the graph that greater utility is gained by a increasing the chance of the prize in
question by 0.1 when the prior chance was 0.9 than when the prior chance was 0.8.
nothing ($0), I only specify the chance of one of these outcomes for each gamble.
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5 Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism
I contend that rational people’s preferences can in general be represented as maxi-
mizing the expectation of a Jeffrey value function, extended to chance propositions
as suggested in the last section. What does this mean for the veil of ignorance ar-
gument? The answer is that the conclusion of the argument is a distributive theory
that seems most natural to interpret as a form of Egalitarianism, but which I shall call
Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism.
Before formulating this version of Egalitarianism, we need to reinterpret the gam-
bles to make them suitable as objects of choice behind the veil of ignorance. Informally,
we can now think of the Xi as different social groups (which might be as small as a
single life), assuming that the different lives in each group are indistinguishable from
the point of view of people behind the veil. More formally, we can interpret each Xi
as an equivalence class of welfare (of lives), where these classes are determined by the
relation - on Ω, which is interpreted as the preference relation of people behind the
veil. So, a numerical measure of welfare is not assumed from the start, but is entailed
by the assumption that - on Ω satisfies the Bolker-Jeffrey axioms.23
Finally, we can reinterpret Ch(Xi) = αi as a proposition specifying the chance of
belonging to social group Xi. So, now think of D = 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 as the distribution
according to which the probability of belonging to social group Xi is αi. And u(Xi) is
the utility of belonging to Xi, as determined by - on Ω.
If the theory sketched in the last section correctly characterizes rational preference,
then people behind the veil will choose the distributionD that, for any n-fold partition
{Yi}ni=1 ofD, maximizes:
DSU(D) =
n∑
i=1
u(Yi)P(Yi | 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉) (3)
23Note that - denotes the (shared) preference relation of people behind the veil. The beliefs and
preferences of the people in the ranked distributions are however not explicitly represented. I assume
that - ranks the lives in terms of how well-off the people leading them are judged to be, but I leave open
the question of how welfare is determined and compared. (See fn. 12.)
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To see why it makes sense to think of the above quantity as distribution-sensitive
(average; see fn. 1) utility, note first that {Xi∩〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉}ni=1 is a an n-fold partition of
〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉. Second, I make the standard assumption of assuming that rational peo-
ple satisfy the Principal Principle, which in the present framework can be formalized
as:24
Principal Principle. For any 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 ∈ ∆:
P(Xi | 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉) = ch(Xi) = αi (4)
In other words, the subjective probability one should assign Xi, if one is certain
that the objective probability of Xi is αi, is αi.
Putting together the last two observations, (3) becomes:
Distribution-Sensitive (Expected) Utility. For anyD = 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 ∈ ∆:
DSU(D) =
n∑
i=1
u(Xi ∩ 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉)αi (5)
In other words, rational preferences behind the veil support the distribution that
maximizes distribution-sensitive utility, which, for any distribution D, is calculated
by, first, figuring out the utility u of belonging to each group when the distribution
is D, second, weighing u by the probability of belonging to that group, and, finally,
adding up these probability weighted and distribution-sensitive utilities. Moreover,
assuming general risk aversion behind the veil, Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism
is distribution-sensitive in an Egalitarian way.
To take an example, suppose that the distribution we are evaluating contains two
equiprobable social groups, X1 and X2, and let the people in X1 be very well off while
the people in X2 are not so well off. To calculate the distribution-sensitive utility
of this distribution, (X1,X2), we find the utility of belonging to group X1 when the
distribution is (X1,X2), weigh that utility by 0.5, and add the result to the utility of
24To simplify, I omit the much discussed and debated “admissibility” proviso (Lewis 1980)
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belonging to group X2 when the distribution is (X1,X2) weighted by 0.5. Since the
measure is distribution-sensitive in an egalitarian direction, at least one of the utilities
in this sum is lower than the corresponding utility when the distribution is (X1,X1),
i.e., when everyone is very well off.
To make this more concrete, suppose that u(X1) = 9 and u(X2) = 4, which we can
interpret as, say, the utility of belonging to group X1 is 9 when no information is added
about the distribution of welfare levels. (So, we can think of this as the expected utility of
belonging to group X1, relative to the agent’s beliefs about the possible distributions.)
Intuitively, it makes sense to think of these numbers as isolating the individual welfare
of belonging to each group when one ignores possible concerns one may have about
the welfare enjoyed by others.
To simplify the notation, let’s now use Ch to denote the above gamble, that is, an
equal chance between belonging to X1 and X2. Moreover, suppose that u(X1∩Ch) = 3,
u(X2∩Ch) = 2. As we shall see below, the assumptions in this paragraph are consistent
with the assumptions in the last paragraph just in case one does not assume Chance
Neutrality, which standard Utilitarianism entails. While it made sense to interpret the
first pair of numbers, 9 and 4, as the individual welfare of belonging to each group, it
would make more sense to interpret the second pair of numbers, 3 and 2, as the moral
value of some person belonging to each group when the distribution is Ch.
Now let’s consider the distribution where everyone belongs to group X1, and,
again to simplify the notation, call this distribution Ch+. The assumption of ambiguity
aversion behind the veil entails that, say, u(X1 ∩ Ch) < u(X1 ∩ Ch+), which means that
the value of a person belonging to X1 is greater when everyone is at the same level of
welfare than when half the population is at a lower level. In other words, by the veil
of ignorance argument, the assumption of ambiguity aversion at the individual level
entails inequality aversion at the social level. In contrast, Utilitarianism on the social
level holds that u(X1 ∩Ch) = u(X1 ∩Ch+), which, as we shall soon see, is equivalent to
ambiguity neutrality behind the veil.
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As the above example illustrates, it would seem natural to interpret the instance of
Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism that the present version of the veil of ignorance
argument supports as Egalitarianism. In particular, if we follow the tradition (going
back to Parfit 1991) of calling Egalitarian any theory that allows for the possibility that
the value that a person contributes towards the overall value of a distribution is not
fully determined by the person’s welfare but also partly determined (in an Egalitar-
ian way) by the distribution of welfare, then Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism is
Egalitarian.
It might be worth noting that Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism can account for
moral benefits of equality that standard Utilitarianism cannot. There are two ways
in which standard Utilitarianism can account for the value of equality. On the one
hand, if we assume that consumption and wealth has decreasing marginal benefits,
then an equal distribution of consumption will, other things being equal, result in
greater aggregate welfare than an unequal distribution. On the other hand, if people
care about equality, in the sense that inequality decreases their welfare, then an equal
distribution of, say, consumption and wealth, will, other things being equal, lead to
greater aggregate welfare than an unequal distribution. Hence, standard Utilitarianism
will, other things being equal, favor an equal distribution of consumption and wealth
over an unequal one, provided that consumption and wealth have decreasing marginal
benefit, and/or individuals in the evaluated population care about equality.
Now, Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism can account for the above two instru-
mental ways in which equality might matter. But in addition, it allows for the possibility
that an equal distribution of welfare is (also) intrinsically valuable, in that its value is
not exhausted by the value that equality contributes in terms of increasing individ-
uals’ welfare. To take an extreme example: Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism can
account for the possibility that equality matters even when evaluating a population
where both nobody is an egalitarian and consumption has constant marginal utility for
everyone.
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Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism is however consistent with various different
(and potentially competing) ways in which the distribution might affect the contribu-
tive value of a life (or a group) at a particular welfare level. For instance, Distribution-
Sensitive Utilitarianism is consistent with the idea that the contributive value of a
life at a particular welfare level is partly determined by how many people have that
level of welfare as compared to how many people are better and worse off. Moreover,
Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism is consistent with the thought that the distribu-
tion effect on the contributive value of a life at a particular welfare level is determined
by the distance in welfare between different groups. Finally, Distribution-Sensitive
Utilitarianism is of course consistent with any combination of the aforementioned two
views. More generally, Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism is consistent with vari-
ous competing Egalitarian views about how and why equality matters; all it says is
that how welfare is distributed can matter to how much any particular welfare level
contributes to overall value.
However, if we assume that rational people behind the veil of ignorance satisfy
what Stefa´nsson and Bradley (2015) call Chance Neutrality (to be explained below), then
the conclusion of the veil of ignorance argument is standard25 Utilitarianism. So, what
I have called Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism is not inconsistent with (standard)
Utilitarianism; rather, the latter is a special case of the former. (Nor is Distribution-
Sensitive Utilitarianism inconsistent with Prioritarianism, as we shall soon see.)
Informally, Chance Neutrality is the view that once it is known which outcome
obtained, it is a matter of ethical and practical irrelevance what the chances were.
As Stefa´nsson and Bradley (2015) note, Chance Neutrality entails what we could call
instrumentalism about chances: Chances only matter in so far as they make good or bad
25 “Standard” Utilitarianism is the view that the moral value of a distribution is a linear additively
separable function of the (final) welfare of the individuals in the distribution. So, Distribution-Sensitive
Utilitarianism is evidently not standard Utilitarianism. From now on, just “Utilitarianism” means stan-
dard Utilitarianism (as opposed to e.g. Distribution-Sensitive or Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism). Simi-
larly, “standard” Prioritarianism is the view that the moral value of a distribution is a concave additively
separable function of the welfare of the individuals in the distribution. From now on, just “Prioritari-
anism” means standard Prioritarianism. (Note that standard Utilitiarnism and Prioritarianism are both
what is called ex post views. That is, they are ultimately concerned with people’s final, or actual, welfare,
not their expected welfare.)
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outcomes more or less likely, but they are of no value in and of themselves. To take
an example, Chance Neutrality entails that if a patient dies of kidney failure, then the
fact that he had, say, the same chance as any other patient of receiving the hospital’s
only kidney makes no difference. More formally:
Chance Neutrality. For any 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 and any Xi:
u(Xi ∩ 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉) = u(Xi) (6)
Now, adding Chance Neutrality to (5) gives us:
Average Utility. For anyD = 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉:
DSU(D) =
∑
u(Xi)αi (7)
Recall that, for the social gambles, u(Xi) is interpreted as the utility of belonging
to group Xi while αi is the probability of belonging to group Xi. So, if people behind
the veil of ignorance satisfy Chance Neutrality, in addition to Desirability and the
Principal Principle, then the distributive principle that the argument from the veil of
ignorance supports is standard (average; recall fn. 1) Utilitarianism.
Stefa´nsson and Bradley (2015) argue at length that Chance Neutrality is not a
requirement of rationality. In fact, it is the denial of Chance Neutrality that allows for
a unified treatment of the Allais preference and ambiguity aversion (Stefa´nsson and
Bradley 2019). Hence, if we want to allow for both types of attitudes behind the veil,
then we should not assume that people behind the veil of ignorance satisfy Chance
Neutrality, and thus we should not assume that the distributive principle that their
preferences support is Utilitarian. Instead, we should assume that it is distribution-
sensitive.
It is important to note that we do not have to assume any particular risk attitude—
for instance, we do not have to assume any particular degree of ambiguity sensitivity
and risk aversion—to get the above result. That is, we do not have to assume some par-
21
ticular attitude to risk to derive Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism from the present
version of the veil of ignorance argument. All we need to assume, to get that result, is
that people behind the veil do not satisfy Chance Neutrality.
Since ambiguity plays a central role in the present paper, it is worth examining
in more detail the relationship between Chance Neutrality and ambiguity neutrality
(ambiguity neutrality being the negation of ambiguity sensitivity). For while Chance
Neutrality and ambiguity sensitivity are both properties of attitudes to chances, it
might not be obvious that they conflict. After all, Chance Neutrality concerns attitudes
to chance distributions once it is known what outcome obtains, whereas ambiguity
sensitivity is an attitude to chance distributions before it is known which outcome
obtains.26 Therefore, it is worth going through a concrete example that illustrates how
Chance Neutrality rules out ambiguity sensitivity (given Desirability and the Principal
Principle). But first, let’s consider some general results that show the tension between
Utilitarianism and ambiguity sensitivity.
To prove general results about the connection between ambiguity neutrality and
Utilitarianism, we need a precise and general definition of ambiguity neutrality. Such
a definition however turns out to be quite complex, so I leave it to the Appendix (A.1).
But informally, the definition simply says that an ambiguity neutral person doesn’t
care if chances are spread or concentrated as long as her subjective expectation of
chance stays the same. On the basis of such a definition, I prove in Appendix A.2:
Proposition 1. If a person satisfies Desirability, the Principal Principle, and Chance Neutral-
ity, then she is ambiguity neutral.27
From the point of view of distributive ethics, the important thing to note about the
above result is that it entails that if we allow for sensitivity to ambiguity behind the veil,
then the resulting distributive principle will not be Utilitarian.28 For given Desirability
26Thanks to Seth Lazar for encouraging this clarification.
27 As observed in Appendix A.2, the importance of the Principal Principle for this result is rather weak,
since only a slight modification (but, in my view, worsening) of the definition of ambiguity neutrality
is required for Desirability and Chance Neutrality to entail ambiguity neutrality without the Principal
Principle.
28Rowe and Voorhoeve (2018) similarly show—albeit by a very different line of argument—that there
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and the Principal Principle (which, I contend, are both normatively unassailable),
and assuming the veil of ignorance argument, it is straightforward to verify that
Utilitarianism on the social level is equivalent to assuming Chance Neutrality on the
individual level. And Proposition 1 tells us that we cannot assume Chance Neutrality
if we want to allow for sensitivity to ambiguity.
The same is true of (standard; see fn. 25) Prioritarianism: If we allow for sensitivity
to ambiguity behind the veil, then the resulting distributive principle will not be Pri-
oritarian. More generally, if we allow for ambiguity sensitivity behind the veil, then
the resulting distributive principle will not be what is sometimes called Generalized
Utilitarianism, of which Prioritarianism and Utilitarianism are two special cases.29
Generalized Utilitarianism holds that the preferences of a social planner should maxi-
mize:
Generalized Utility. There is a non-decreasing function pi from R to R such that, for any
D = 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 and any Xi:
GU(D) =
∑
i
pi(u(Xi))αi (8)
If φ is strictly increasing, then Generalized Utilitarianism is Prioritarianism if pi is
concave, “Anti-Prioritarianism” if pi is instead convex, but Utilitarianism if pi is linear.
It is straightforward to verify that given the veil of ignorance setting, Desirability and
the Principal Principle, Generalized Utilitarianism is equivalent to:
Generalized Chance Neutrality. There is a non-decreasing function pi from R to R such
that, for any gamble 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 and any Xi:
u(Xi ∩ 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉) = pi(u(Xi)) (9)
is a tension between Utilitarianism and ambiguity aversion.
29Note however that neither Distribution-Sensitive Utilitarianism nor Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism
are special cases of Generalized Utilitarianism, since Generalized Utilitarianism is a generalization of
standard Utilitarianism. See fn. 25.
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Less formally, Generalized Chance Neutrality states that the utility of winning
some prize Xi from a gamble 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 is an increasing function of the utility of Xi.
But unlike Chance Neutrality, Generalized Chance Neutrality allows for the possibility
that the utility of winning some prize Xi from a gamble 〈Ch(Xi) = αi〉 differs from the
utility of Xi.
The equivalence between Generalized Utilitarianism and Generalized Chance Neu-
trality, given the above assumptions, has a peculiar30 implication for Prioritarianism.
This implication is informally explained below, but formally the implication is that
Prioritarians must assume that for some Xi:
u(Ch(Xi) = 1) , u(Xi) (10)
In other words, if the veil of ignorance argument is to support Prioritarianism, it
has to be assumed (given Desirability and the Principal Principle) that the utility of
a gamble that results in Xi for sure can be different from the utility of Xi. To take
an example, the utility of a social gamble that will for sure result in you living at a
particular level of welfare is, by 10, different from the utility of you living at that level
of welfare. To take another example, the utility of a gamble that will for sure result in
you gaining $10 is, by 10, different from the utility of you gaining $10.
The reason why Prioritarians must assume inequality 10 for some Xi is the fol-
lowing. Recall that according to standard Prioritarian thinking, the function pi, which
determines which weight to give to any level of welfare, is independent of which dis-
tribution is being evaluated; for instance, what determines the value that a life barely
worth living contributes to the total value of a distribution is independent of whether
everyone else in the distribution is better or worse off.31 Hence, the only way to prevent
30“Peculiar” might be an understatement, as the inequality 10 might be taken to show that the theory
is not coherent (as Seth Lazar points out).
31This follows from an assumption of separability in value across persons, which is made by Prioritarians
from Parfit (1991) to e.g. Holtug (2007) and Adler (2011). The typical Prioritarian justification for such
separability is that the reason why benefits to the worse off matter more than benefits to the better off,
is not that the former are worse off than others; rather, it has to do with their absolute level off well-(or
ill-)being. As Holtug (2007: 132) puts it: “A benefit that falls at a particular level of welfare has the
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inequality 10 from ever holding, given Generalized Chance Neutrality, is to assume
that in general, pi(u(Xi)) = u(Xi). For if this equality does not hold, then there will be
some utility value for which inequality 10 holds.32 But if equalitypi(u(Xi)) = u(Xi) does
hold, then Generalized Chance Neutrality collapses into Chance Neutrality. And recall
that by the veil of ignorance argument (and assuming Desirability and the Principal
Principle), Chance Neutrality is equivalent to standard Utilitarianism. Hence, the only
way to prevent Prioritarianism from collapsing into Utilitarianism, is to assume that
inequality 10 holds for some Xi.
Before coming back to ambiguity sensitivity, I shall make two observations about
the above inequality 10. First, the inequality 10 is the personal-gamble analogue of
an obvious property of Prioritarianism, namely, that even when only one person is
involved in say a policy intervention, Prioritarianism entails that the contributive value
of that person’s welfare to the moral value of the intervention might not be proportional
to the difference in welfare to that individual brought by the intervention. To put it
differently, the Prioritarian value of a “distribution” of welfare over just one individual
might not be proportional to (and hence, might not be equal to) that person’s welfare.33
As others have noted, this feature of Prioritarianism means that the theory may rank
gambles that could only affect the welfare of a single individual differently from the
individual’s own (prudential) ranking of gambles.34 Nevertheless, I suspect that many
Prioritarians will find inequality 10 to be a rather difficult bullet to bite. After all, it
would seem hard to accept that, say, the utility of a gamble that results in you gaining
$10 for sure is different from the utility of you gaining $10.
Second, inequality 10 is not entailed by the failure of Chance Neutrality. To take a
very simple example, Chance Neutrality is violated if for all αi:35
same moral value no matter what levels other individuals are at.” (See also e.g. Parfit’s 1991: 104 famous
altitude analogy.)
32To take an example, if pi(u(Xi)) =
√
u(Xi), then u(Ch(Xi) = 1) , u(Xi) unless u(Xi) equals 0 or 1.
33For instance, suppose GU(D) = ∑i √u(Xi)αi, which would make the evaluation of welfare distribu-
tions Prioritarian. Then even for a single person “distribution”, where the person in question belongs to
“group” Xi, GU(D) , u(Xi) unless u(Xi) equals 0 or 1.
34See e.g. Rabinowicz (2002), Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009), Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (2012).
35To see that 11 violates Chance Neutrality, note that by Desirability and the Principal Principle, Chance
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u(Ch(Xi) = αi) = u(Xi)
√
αi (11)
But equation 11 is inconsistent with inequality 10. Hence, the failure of Chance
Neutrality does not entail inequality 10.
Back then to the examination of the relationship between ambiguity sensitivity
and theories of distributive ethics. Given what we have already learned about Chance
Neutrality, it might not come as a surprise that Generalized Chance Neutrality is
(given Desirability and the Principal Principle) inconsistent with ambiguity sensitivity.
Therefore, if we assume, say, ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance, then
not only have we ruled out the possibility that the preferences that people display
will support (standard) Utilitarianism; we have also ruled out that those preferences
support Prioritarianism. For a straightforward corollary of Proposition 1 is that:
Proposition 2. If a person satisfies Desirability, the Principal Principle, and Generalized
Chance Neutrality, then she is ambiguity neutral
For a concrete illustration of Propositions 1 and 2, and to see precisely what role
(Generalized) Chance Neutrality plays, consider again the choice between bets on two
coins, one of which is known to have an equal chance of resulting in heads as in tails,
while the other is known to be either double headed or double tailed; where in each case
one gets $10 if the coin comes up heads but nothing otherwise. Let the bet on the fair
coin coming up heads beA = Ch($10) = 0.5∩Ch($0) = 0.5 and let the bet on the biased
coin coming up heads be B = {Ch($10) = 0 ∩ Ch($0) = 1} ∪ {Ch($10) = 1 ∩ Ch($0) = 0}.
Finally, suppose that a person prefers A to B and satisfies Desirability and the
Principal Principle. Furthermore, suppose that she is equally confident that the second
coin is double headed as double tailed. Then according to her desirability function V,
and simplifying the notation somewhat (see fn. 22), we have:
Neutrality entails Linearity (Stefa´nsson and Bradley 2015), which states that the value of a gamble is a
probability weighted sum of the utilities of the gamble’s possible outcomes. Hence, Linearity entails that
u(Ch(Xi) = αi) = u(Xi)αi, which rules out that equation 11 holds for all αi.
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V(Ch($10 = 1) ∪ Ch($10) = 0) < V(Ch($10) = 0.5) (12)
So, by Desirability and the Principal Principle:
u($10 ∩ Ch($10) = 1)0.5 + u($0 ∩ Ch($10) = 0)0.5
< u($10 ∩ Ch($10) = 0.5)0.5 + u($0 ∩ Ch($10) = 0.5)0.5 (13)
Hence, for this person to prefer A to B, at least one of the following inequalities
must hold:36
u($10 ∩ Ch($10) = 1) < u($10 ∩ Ch($10) = 0.5) (14)
u($0 ∩ Ch($10) = 0) < u($0 ∩ Ch($10) = 0.5) (15)
But, according to (Generalized) Chance Neutrality, neither of the above two in-
equalities can hold, which illustrates why a person who satisfies Desirability and the
Principal Principle will not be ambiguity averse if she satisfies (Generalized) Chance
Neutrality.
So, to summarize this section, we have found that if Stefa´nsson and Bradley’s
(2015, 2019) characterization of rational preference is correct, and by assuming general
risk aversion, rational preferences behind the veil of ignorance support a form of
Egalitarianism. We have also seen that the conditions necessary and sufficient for
such preferences to support either Utilitarianism or Prioritarianism are inconsistent
with people being ambiguity sensitive behind the veil. Hence, if we want to allow for
ambiguity sensitivity, then we should neither take the veil of ignorance argument to
support Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism.
36I assume that receiving $10 dollars is preferred to receiving $0. But that assumption is obviously not
essential to the argument.
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6 Concluding remarks
The findings of this paper raise the interesting question of why there is a connection
between ambiguity aversion and Egalitarianism. The formal connection between risk
aversion and Egalitarianism is, unlike the connection between ambiguity aversion
and Egalitarianism, already well understood. Moreover, the connection between
risk aversion and Egalitarianism is quite straightforward to intuitively understand,
since the risk averse and the Egalitarian share the view that mean values do not
completely determine the value of a distribution; the spread in values matters too. But
once one recognizes that the ambiguity averse share this view too, as argued above,
then the connection between ambiguity aversion and Egalitarianism should seem less
mysterious. After all, for a given mean value, the ambiguity averse prefers the possible
chance values to be as little spread—i.e, as equal—as possible.
Appendix: General definitions and proofs
A.1. Definition of ambiguity sensitivity
Recall that an ambiguity averse person prefers as little spread as possible in the sub-
jectively possible chances. So, we can for instance characterize ambiguity neutrality
(i.e., neither aversion to nor love for ambiguity) as follows:37
Definition (Ambiguity neutrality). First, I define two objective gambles Gα and Gβ over
{X1, ...,Xn}:
• Let Gα = 〈Chα(Xi) = αi〉,
• Let Gβ = 〈Chβ(Xi) = βi〉.
Second, I define a mixture of Gα and Gβ, Gαβ, for p ∈ [0, 1], as follows:
37As Machina and Siniscalchi (2014) note, there is no agreement on precisely what ambiguity sensitivity
is. Hence, there is little hope for an agreed upon definition of ambiguity neutrality. The suggested
definition is however in the spirit of an influential definition suggested by Schmeidler (1989). But it is
modified in line with the framework favored in this paper (and it is a definition of ambiguity neutrality,
rather than ambiguity aversion).
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• Let Gαβ = 〈Chαβ(Xi) = pαi + (1 − p)βi〉.
Third, I define a union of our objective gambles, which can be thought of as a subjective gamble
between objective gambles:38
• Let Gα∪β = Gα ∪ Gβ,
• where Gα ∩ Gβ = ⊥,
• and, according to our agent’s subjective probability, P: P(Gα | Gα∪β) = p, so P(Gβ |
Gα∪β) = 1 − p.
Finally, we say that the agent is ambiguity neutral, w.r.t. {X1, ...,Xn}, just in case for any p:
Gαβ ∼ Gα∪β (16)
To illustrate the above definition, consider again the coin example:
• Let Gα = 〈Chα($10) = 1 ∩ Chα($0) = 0〉,
• Let Gβ = 〈Chβ($10) = 0 ∩ Chβ($0) = 1〉,
• Let Gαβ = 〈Chαβ($10) = p(1) + (1 − p)(0) ∩ Chαβ($0) = p(0) + (1 − p)(1)〉.
Now, if p = 0.5, then Gαβ is equivalent to the bet on the coin that is known to be fair,
and if P(Gα | Gα ∪Gβ) = P(Gβ | Gα ∪Gβ), then Gα ∪Gβ is the bet on the biased coin. So,
the preference I have been discussing, Gα∪Gβ ≺ Gαβ, is not ambiguity neutral. Hence,
we have evidence that the definition of ambiguity neutrality is apt.
Since ambiguity neutrality has not previously been defined for the present frame-
work, it is worth comparing the above definition to Ellsberg’s (1961) classical three-
color example, where subjects know that 1/3 of the balls are red and that 2/3 are either
black or yellow:
38Such unions corresponds in our framework to what is sometimes called “horse-roulette acts”, since
they can be thought of as bets on a horse race where the prizes are to spin a roulette wheel, or “Anscombe-
Aumann acts” (both terms referring to the seminal work of Anscombe and Aumann 1963).
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red black yellow
g1 $100 $0 $0
g2 $0 $100 $0
g3 $100 $0 $100
g4 $0 $100 $100
Table 1: Ellsberg Paradox
The frequently observed “Ellsberg preference” is: g2 ≺ g1, g3 ≺ g4.
For illustrative purposes, suppose that our subject believes that either all of the
2/3 are black or all of the 2/3 are yellow and is equally confident of each possibility.
(The result below, i.e., that the Ellsberg preference is not ambiguity neutral given the
above definition, does not however depend on this simplifying assumption.) Then
given our framework (and ignoring the $0 to keep things as simple as possible), we
can formulate the gambles as:
• g1 = 〈Chg1($100) = 1/3〉
• g2 = 〈Chg12($100) = 0〉 ∪ 〈Chg22($100) = 2/3〉
• g3 = 〈Chg13($100) = 1/3〉 ∪ 〈Chg23($100) = 1〉
• g4 = 〈Chg4($100) = 2/3〉
Now consider a mixture between the two “subjectively possible” chance distributions
in g2:
Ch($100) = p(0) + (1 − p)(2/3) (17)
When p = 0.5, Ch($100) = p(0) + (1 − p)(2/3) is identical to g1. So, g1 is a mixture
between the two subjectively possible chance distributions in g2. Hence, a person with
the Ellsberg preference g2 ≺ g1 is not ambiguity neutral (given the above simplifying
assumptions). An analogous argument shows g3 ≺ g4 is not ambiguity neutral. Hence,
we have further evidence that the proposed definition of ambiguity neutrality is apt.
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A.2. Proof of main proposition
Proposition 1. If a person satisfies Desirability, the Principal Principle, and Chance Neutral-
ity, then she is ambiguity neutral.
Proof. Consider the subjective gamble, Gα ∪ Gβ, from the definition of ambiguity
neutrality. By Desirability and the Principal Principle:
V(Gα ∪ Gβ) = p
∑
i
u(Xi ∩ Gα)αi
 + (1 − p)
∑
i
u(Xi ∩ Gβ)βi

=
∑
i
u(Xi ∩ Gα)(αi)p +
∑
i
u(Xi ∩ Gβ)(βi)(1 − p) (18)
V(Gαβ) =
∑
i
u(Xi ∩ Gαβ)(pαi + (1 − p)βi) (19)
By Chance Neutrality, (18) and (19) become:
V(Gα ∪ Gβ) =
∑
i
u(Xi)(αi)p +
∑
i
u(Xi)(βi)(1 − p) (20)
V(Gαβ) =
∑
i
u(Xi)(pαi + (1 − p)βi) =
∑
i
u(Xi)(αi)p +
∑
i
u(Xi)(βi)(1 − p) (21)
Hence, since V represents -, we have Gα ∪ Gβ ∼ Gαβ. 
Observation. In footnote 27, I said that the importance of the Principal Principle
for the result proven above is rather weak. To see this, note that had the mixture, in
the definition of ambiguity neutrality, been defined in terms of the agent’s subjective
conditional probabilities rather than in terms of the objective probabilities, then we
could have, without assuming the Principal Principle, proven that if a person satisfies
Desirability and Chance Neutrality, then she is ambiguity neutral. (This can be seen
by replacing the alphas and betas in the above proof with the relevant conditional
subjective probabilities.) However, since I take it to be important for the concept of
ambiguity that the mixture is an objective one, I find the suggested definition to be
superior to one where the mixtures are defined in terms of subjective probabilities.
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